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Summary 
One of the main issues in the climate policy agenda, the timing of abatement efforts, 
hinges on the uncertainties of climate change risks and technological evolution. We use 
a stochastic optimization framework and jointly explore these two features. First, we 
embed in the model future potential large-scale availability of Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) technologies. While non-CCS mitigation that reduces fossil energy use is 
modelled as exerting inertia on the economic system, mainly due to the durability of the 
capital in energy systems and to technology lock-in and lock-out phenomena, the 
implementation of CCS technologies is modelled as implying less resilience of the 
system to changes in policy directions. Second, climate uncertainty is related in the 
model to the atmospheric temperature response to an increase in GHGs concentration. 
Performing different simulation experiments, we find that the environmental target, 
derived from a cost-benefit analysis, should be more ambitious when CCS is included in 
the picture. Moreover, the possible future availability of CCS is not a reason to 
significantly reduce near-term optimal abatement efforts. Finally, the availability of 
better information on the climate cycle is in general more valuable than better 
information on the CCS technological option. 
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It has become fashionable to assess the potential contribution of Carbon Capture
and Sequestration (CCS) technologies to the optimal mitigation of carbon diox-
ide emissions that is intended to avoid future, dangerous climate change. CCS
attracts a lot of attention because it could allow ”to reduce our CO2 emissions
to the atmosphere whilst continuing to use fossil fuels” [10]. More precisely,
analyses of the optimal timing of CO2 abatement suggest that, after 2050, car-
bon dioxide emissions could be signiﬁcantly and increasingly curbed thanks to
sequestration [22, 1]. Results in these publications show that, in 2100, sequestra-
tion could account for around 40% of the reduction required to stabilize carbon
atmospheric concentration to 550 ppmv. In particular, Akimoto et al. [1] present
a sensitivity analysis and suggest that this 40% contribution is relatively robust
against changes in the CCS costs. In addition, few abatement efforts should be
undertaken before 2030 to reach the 550 ppmv stabilization target [22, 1]. This
result is conﬁrmed even under an hypothesis of high baseline emissions[1]. Of
course, deferring emissions reduction is politically attractive for it avoids requir-
ing explicit efforts from the populations. To policy makers who tend to oppose
the notion of early abatement, CCS technologies offer a credible argument for
postponing efforts.
However, the opportunity offered by CCS should be envisioned in a perspec-
tive broader than that of a cost-efﬁciency analysis as taken till now. If globally,
large scale implementation of carbon sequestration could have a signiﬁcant im-
pact on our future emissions, should not we take it as a chance to adopt a cli-
mate target tighter (and safer) than the doubling of pre-industrial atmospheric
carbon dioxide (550ppm)? Previous cost-beneﬁt analyses of CCS in top-down
integrated assessment models have focused on forest-based sequestration or on
the non-permanency of sequestration[15, 8, 13]. In particular, in Keller et al.[13]
the impact on the optimal carbon tax of the availability of CCS technologies is
considered and appears to be insigniﬁcant before 2100; this also suggests that
abatement policies before that date should remain unchanged. However, Keller et
al. assume a rather high marginal cost for CCS (100 USD per ton C) which de-
lays the adoption of the option later into the future than more recent contributions
suggest [1, 22].
In addition to this, the prevailing scientiﬁc uncertainties, in particular about
the climate, have implications affecting the optimal strategy for curbing green-
house gases emissions (see for instance Nordhaus[18, chapter 8], and also[21,
14, 20, 12]) and should be included in the analysis. How largely does CCS future
availability impact on the optimal hedging policy?
Finally, CCS singles out from mitigation actions, such as the reduction of
energy demand and the switching towards carbon-free energy, that have lasting
2effects on the future energy input and emission output of the economy (see for
instance[5]). CCS implementation does not carry as much transformation of the
energy system since it is more like an end-of-pipe activity that can be easily inter-
rupted in the future if global warming concerns fade out. Inertia of energy produc-
tion and consumption has been pointed to be of concern for deﬁning the hedging
policy against the risks of the evolution of the climate [7]. When relying on both
CCS and other mitigation options, the optimal hedging policy should therefore
account for their dissimilar lasting effects on greenhouse gases emissions.
This article proposes to assess the relevance of the future availability of CCS
in the designing of near-term (ﬁrst decades) abatement policy and in the choice
of a climate target. The originality of the approach taken here stands on the fact
that the analysis relies on a cost-beneﬁt top-down integrated assessment model,
that allows to represent inertia of carbon emission trends and sequential decision
in the face of uncertainty and learning about climate risks. This model, named the
DISCERNI model1 is derived from DICE–99 [19].
A number of numerical simulation experiments have been undertaken. In par-
ticular, simulation experiments show that two main conclusions can be drawn:
(a) The environmental target that can be derived by applying a Cost-Beneﬁt
analysis should be more ambitious (stringent) if CCS is considered as an option
that might become available.
(b) The possible future availability of CCS is not a reason to signiﬁcantly
reduce the near-term abatement efforts that would be optimal with no CCS.
We begin with a description of the model in Section 2. Section 3 describes the
different scenarios simulated and presents the main results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model and Simulations Description
The model we used, DISCERNI, is based on the latest version of Nordhaus’ DICE
[19], and it is an optimal economic growth model of the global economy that in-
cludes a climate module linked to carbon emissions deriving from the economic
activity. DISCERNI departs from the original DICE in order to account for some
key features that are particularly relevant for the purpose for our analysis. In par-
ticular, it is structured in order to allow for sequential revision of decisions in the
face of uncertainty and learning about climate risks. To this end, it is formulated
as a probabilistic optimization problem, which maximizes the expected utility of
consumption. After the date of learning, expected utility is conditional on the
1This name is a foreign acronym for ‘Double uncertainty on the climate and on the endogenous
reduction of carbon itensity’. Only one uncertainty, climate uncertainty, is considered in this
article.
3knowledge gained. This approach was also used in previous studies as in Nord-
haus[18, chapter 8] and in Nordhaus and Popp[20]. The other main change is that
themodelaccountsfortechnologicalinertia, afeaturethatappearstoplayasignif-
icant role in shaping optimal mitigation strategies (see for example Ha-Duong et
al.[7]). We represent inertia by making future carbon intensity depending on past
abatement efforts whether a constraint on emissions is still active or not, as de-
scribed in[4] where a calibrated extension of the representation introduced in [9]
is proposed.
Finally, and this is the main novelty presented in the paper, as an alternative
to traditional abatement effort we allow in the model the possibility of carbon
capture and geological sequestration (CCS).
For a formal description of the model the reader is referred to the appendix
where model equations are set out. In particular, emissions are modelled as pro-
portional to gross economic output and the carbonization ratio is decreasing over
time. However, the central planner can choose the level of emissions through a
variable representing the rate of mitigation. This abatement rate is deﬁned in the
model as ; to this is added an alternative decision variable, CCS, accounting
for the abatement rate due to CCS technologies. CCS is modelled as to produce
an impact on the deriving structure of the economy different from that of mitiga-
tion. Finally, while the costs of abatement through mitigation remain unchanged
compared to the DICE model, CCS marginal costs are different.
The current estimated costs of CCS are rather high. While injection costs are
variable and extremely dependent on the reservoir type and on local condition [3],
the costs for capture and transport represent the largest part. They are estimated
between 35 and 264 USD per ton C for CO2 capture and transport from power
plants [22]; for the cement industry, the range is 183–917 USD/tC [10]. Further-
more, costs for capture and transport would decrease through the century, mainly
due to learning-by-doing. Besides, the physical potential for storage could be
very large: for underground storage2 alone, global estimates range between 960
and 1,450 GtCO2 (40–390 GtC), while, the capacity of deep saline aquifers is es-
timated between 6,000 and 10,000 GtCO2 (1,600–2,750 GtC) [Table TS5, IPCC
2005 Technical Report on CCS].
In the model, costs of CCS are assumed to be quadratic in the level of effort
with a linear component of 10 USD/tC and marginal costs increasing up to 400
USD, as proposed in 3 by R. Gerlagh and B. van der Zwaan. We take 10 GtC per
year as the maximum volume of CCS (corresponding to the marginal cost of 450
USD/tC). Besides, no leakages or auto-consumption of energy are assumed for
2In porous and permeable reservoir stocks, depleted oil and gas ﬁelds, and coal beds [10].
3R. Gerlagh and B. van der Zwaan, 2004, presentation at the 2nd international workshop on
integrated climate models: an interdisciplinary assessment of climate impacts and policies. 29–20
November 2004, Trieste. ’Instrument choice for a deep cut in carbon dioxide emissions’.
4CCS.
Before heading to the results of the simulated policy scenarios, we present in
detail the relevant features of the model.
Path-dependency of emissions to past abatement and CCS
In any time period t, the economy tends to emit t units of GHGs per unit of gross
output. Emissions to the atmosphere can be reduced either by changes in the
production and consumption (for example reducing the input of primary carbon
energy) or by capture and sequestration. We denote by t the rate of emission
control through economic structural changes and by CCS
t the rate of emissions
control derived from CCS technologies. As a result, the number of units of GHGs
emitted per unit of gross economic output becomes (1   t   CCS
t )t (where
t + CCS
t  1).
CCS technologies, on the one hand, and efforts to reduce primary fossil en-
ergy consumption, on the other hand, have contrasting impacts on the economy
in the long term. Efforts to use less fossil energy imply changes that will last for
some time into the future (think for instance to non fossil capacities for electricity
production). Therefore, efforts in period t also contribute to the decrease of fu-
ture trends of uncontrolled GHG emissions4 per unit of output, t+1;t+2;::: The
advantage of CCS is precisely to avoid such deep and structural changes in the
economy that would possibly require costly investments and transformations of
consumption habits. CCS efforts at time t do not modify the fossil consumptions
but prevent their emissions from spreading and accumulating in the atmosphere.
Therefore, in contrast with other mitigation options, investments in CCS technolo-
gies at time t have no impact on the future rate of uncontrolled emissions per unit
of output.
To portray this in the model, the uncontrolled carbon intensity, t, is deﬁned
as a state variable which depends on previous period non-CCS reduction efforts,
on previous period uncontrolled intensity and on an exogenous trend. We follow
[4] for the description and calibration of the law of motion for t, which is given
in the following equation:
t+1 = (1   e)
0
t+1 + et
0
t+1
0
t
(1   t); (1)
where the exogenous trend, 0
t, starting at 0
0, represent the baseline carbon in-
tensity level, when no control efforts are implemented; t is the decision variable
deﬁning the rate of abatement; e and  are parameters deﬁned on the interval
4Emissions that are produced at t + 1 and in subsequent periods in the case when any policy
constraining emissions is removed at t + 1.
5[0;1]. In particular, e measures the relative importance of the exogenous versus
the endogenous part of the process and  the share of abatement effort having a
long-lasting effect. Conversely, in the DICE model, t is an exogenous parameter
ﬁxed to its baseline level,  t = 0
t; this leads to an overestimation of the optimal
emissions, see [4].
The Treatment of Uncertainty
Let us now discuss the issue of uncertainty on the climate. Climate uncertainty is
captured by recognizing in the modelling design that today we ignore the true
value of the ’climate sensitivity’ parameter, i.e. the elevation in temperature
for a doubling in GHGs atmospheric concentrations. While yet unknown, the
IPCC[11] reports that the value of the climate sensitivity parameter can be in-
cluded between a range of 1.4 and 4.5 deg C. .
Climate sensitivity is represented by a random variable  and the model is de-
signed to solve the maximization of the discounted expected utility of consump-
tion (see Appendix B). Once information is obtained, variables in subsequent pe-
riods depend on the possible values of the observation.
Weapproximateuncertaintythroughadiscreteprobabilityimplyingthreestates
of nature each characterized by a value of the ’climate sensitivity’ parameter.
The three sample values are chosen in order to offer the best compromise be-
tween diversity and ’plausibility’ as suggested by Ha-Duong[6]. The samples
proposed result in a low (T2x = 1:4deg C), a high (T2x = 4:0deg C) and a central
(T2x = 2:9deg C) climate sensitivity. The central value (2.9degC) happens to be
the parameter value retained in the original DICE 99 model. We have assumed
equal probabilities of 33% for these three samples5
3 Policy simulations
While our goal is to assess within a cost-beneﬁt model whether the contribution
of CCS should be seen as a tool to limit more potential climate damages or as a
way to avoid some abatement efforts, it is instructive to start by bringing forward
the effect of including CCS into the cost-efﬁciency version of the model. This
version includes the usual exogenous concentration target of 550 ppmv and does
notconsiderclimatedamages, inordertoprovideacompletepictureoftheclimate
policy cost.
5A uniform probability distribution for these three values of the climate sensitivity belongs to
the set of credible probability distributions determined by Ha-Duong [6] using the data on expert’s
opinion collected by Morgan and Keith[16].
63.1 Cost-efﬁcient policy, the 550 ppmv target
Let us begin by describing the optimal policy that allows to stabilize carbon at-
mospheric concentration at 550 ppmv. No climate damages enter the objective
function and, since the target refers to carbon concentration, uncertainty on the
evolution of the temperature does not matter.
When the CCS option is not available, in the DICE model, as well as in the
DISCERNI model, the levels of abatement required are quite low. This mainly
derives from the fact that baseline emissions grow moderately and reach 15 GtC in
2100, which is a relatively low level when compared with the B2 marker scenario
of IPCC SRES [2, 17], where emissions grow over 23 GtC in 2100. Marginal
abatement costs are also quite low, and remain under the threshold of 10 USD/tC
until 2040 in DICE and until 2070 in DISCERNI. When CCS is available, it enters
only after the 10 USD/tC threshold is reached. As a consequence, cumulated
sequestration by 2100 is modest (55 GtC in DICE, 7.8 GtC in DISCERNI).
DISCERNI model
2000 2010 2020 2050
Reduction from baseline, except CCS (MtC)
CCS available from 2030 117 189 288 812
CCS unavailable 133 214 324 894
 % CCS vs. no CCS -12% -12% -11% -9 %
CCS (MtC) n.a. n.a. n.a. 0
DICE model
2000 2010 2020 2050
Reduction from baseline, except CCS (MtC)
CCS available from 2030 72 130 221 873
CCS unavailable 94 169 287 1,132
 % CCS vs. no CCS -23% -23% -23% -23%
CCS (MtC) n.a. n.a. n.a. 88
Table 1: Effect of CCS availability on cost-efﬁcient abatement. 550 ppm target.
DICE and DISCERNI models.
However, CCS availability allows to bypass a signiﬁcant share of the modest
reduction efforts engaged in 2000–2029 (see Table 1 for a summary of the main
results). Thanks to future CCS availability, 10 to 20% of those earlier period
efforts can be bypassed6. Abatement costs decrease even more dramatically (be-
6For a better comparability with the next section, we have also performed this comparison
7cause the cost function is a power function): in 2000, abatement costs are reduced
by roughly 20% in the DISCERNI model and by 40% in the DICE model.
The 550 ppmv target is central in the debate of mitigation policies. It also
turns out to be loosely related to the cost-beneﬁt analysis of the DICE model; in
the optimal C-B scenario the model reaches a concentration of 552 ppmv in 2100
but then concentrations grow further during the next century. However, the con-
cern of opposers to a 550 ppmv stabilization target is that it may imply an increase
in temperature to undesirable and perhaps dangerous levels. Indeed, if the central
value hypothesis for the climate sensitivity parameter turned out to be the more
realistic, a 550 ppmv concentration target would imply a temperature rise slightly
above 2 degrees Celsius by 2100 that would continue to increase during the next
century. Therefore, CCS could be seen as an opportunity to tighten the policy tar-
get rather than as an opportunity to postpone efforts to limit concentrations under
550 ppmv. In the next subsection a cost-beneﬁt analysis framework is adopted to
explore this question.
3.2 Optimal cost-beneﬁt policy, DISCERNI
Thefollowingresults(seeTable2)areobtainedbyapplyingacost-beneﬁtanalysis
using the DISCERNI model with the central value for climate sensitivity (2.9, as
in DICE) :
(a) in contrast to cost-efﬁciency analysis, CCS availability by 2030 brings
almost no change to near-term optimal emissions/reductions from baseline, even
though the optimal cost-beneﬁt scenario of DISCERNI implies high abatement
expenses in the near-term.
(b) After 2030, non-CCS abatement efforts are reduced, but emission reduc-
tions deriving from CCS technologies do more than compensate the reduction in
standard abatement efforts. Clearly, CCS represents an opportunity to abate larger
emission amounts.
(c) Optimal CO2 concentration and temperature levels reached by 2100 and
2200 are reduced when CCS is available. The impact on 2100 levels, however, is
modest. (see Table 3).
Since CCS availability as little effect on optimal reductions from the baseline,
we can conjecture that this property is still veriﬁed when uncertainty on the cli-
mate(oronfuture CCSavailability) isaccountedfor. Thenextsectioninvestigates
this point.
with a concentration target enforced from 2100 and ﬁxed at the optimal level taken from the cost-
beneﬁt analysis (see next section) of DISCERNI without CCS available. This time-varying target
is more ambitious than the 550 ppmv one and increase the relief offered by CCS availability in
DISCERNI: in the near term, 20% of abatement can be bypassed.
8DISCERNI model
2000 2010 2020 2050 2100
Reduction from baseline, except CCS (MtC)
CCS available from 2030 808 1,605 2,440 5,133 9,132
CCS unavailable 815 1,618 2,461 5,170 9,207
 % CCS vs. no CCS -1% -1% -1% -1 % -1 %
CCS (MtC) n.a. n.a. n.a. 531 1,321
Table 2: Effect of CCS availability on optimal emissions. Cost-beneﬁt analysis,
DISCERNI model.
Note that due to the inertia of emissions trends, the reductions from baseline aggregate both cur-
rrent reduction efforts and the consequences of past abattement. This second effect dominates
when abatement policies have been followed over several decades. For example, in 2050, the cur-
rent abattement is 2,42 GtC when CCS available, 2,45 when CCS is not available. CCS represents
indeed a large part of the currrent effort by 2100 but its impact on abatement is limited.
3.3 Optimal hedging policy, DISCERNI
Uncertainty about climate sensitivity is assumed to be resolved by 2040. After
that date, policy decisions depend on the information obtained. Before that date,
policy decisions are the same for all states of nature. The results are very close
to those of the preceding section; note that total emissions rather than emissions
reductions from baseline are now reported (see Table 3 and Figure 1 in appendix
A).
In particular, CCS still offers an opportunity to reduce emission more com-
pared to the baseline. This effect is even more pronounced when the information
obtained in 2040 reveals that the climate sensitivity parameter takes its ’Central’
or ’High’ value. In particular, in the case where the parameter takes the ’Cen-
tral’ value and CCS is optimally adopted, the resulting level of emissions is even
lower than in the case where no CCS option is available and the climate sensitivity
parameter takes the ’High’ value.
An identical comparison exercise has been performed with DICE. In particu-
lar, when the climate sensitivity parameter takes the ’Central’ value and no uncer-
tainty is considered, the resulting optimal concentration in 2100 decreases from
552 to 537 ppmv, which corresponds to one decade postponement in the CO2
atmospheric accumulation process.
Finally, the slight difference in near-term policy between scenarios with or
without CCS let us conjecture that getting better information on the availability
of this option in the future has a small value when compared to that placed on the
9Hedging policy sensitivity 2.9
2000 2010 2020 2050 2100 2200
Emissions (GtC)
CCS available from 2030 6.565 6.786 6.854 6.038
CCS unavailable 6.558 6.773 6.835 6.528
 % CCS vs. no CCS 0.11% 0.19% 0.28% -7.51%
CCS (volume in GtC) 0.527 1.323
Other Reductions (volume in GtC)
CCS available from 2030 1.741 2.427
CCS unavailable 1.752 2.448
 % CCS vs. no CCS -0.63% -0.88%
Concentration (ppm)
CCS available from 2030 465 457
CCS unavailable 478 518
Warming (Celsius)
CCS available from 2030 1.69 2.00
CCS unavailable 1.75 2.31
Cumulated CCS, GtC 61 318
Table 3: Key variables, DISCERNI
possibility of getting earlier and better information on the climate sensitivity to an
increase in carbon concentration.
4 Conclusions
As recalled by Holloway [10] the geological storage of CO2 needs to be guar-
anteed at least ‘until there has been a signiﬁcant decline in the atmospheric CO2
levels’. Thus the necessary time frame for storage might be in the range of a few
hundred years to a few thousand years. In any case, this is ‘greater than the likely
lifetime of any corporation’ and raises the issue of liability and of acceptability of
this option by the public.
Nevertheless, carbon capture and storage technologies are recognized as a
promising and, in many ways, politically attractive way of reducing emissions
10without dramatically changing the fuel mix or the energy intensity of the econ-
omy. The discussion often focuses on the potential cost reduction that could be
obtained through learning-by-doing and research and development expenditures
and the resulting rates of penetration of such a new technology. In this paper we
have taken a slightly different perspective, asking the question of what should the
optimal emission strategy be, admitting that the CCS option may become avail-
able at reasonable costs in the future.
The ﬁrst result that can be drawn from the simulation experiments is that the
environmental target which can be derived by applying a Cost-Beneﬁt analysis
should be more ambitious (stringent) if CCS is considered as a potentially avail-
able option. Thus, instead of considering CCS as a future way out of the problem
of anthropogenic emissions and their effect on the climate, this technology should
be integrated in a broader strategy aiming at modifying the economic structure
towards better energy standards and carbon-free fuels. The second main conclu-
sion, strictly connected to the ﬁrst, is that, the possible future availability of CCS
is not a reason to signiﬁcantly reduce the otherwise optimal abatement efforts to
be undertaken in the present and in the near future. The third conclusion concerns
the value of getting better information. Previous conclusion let us conjecture that
obtaining a better understanding of the climate cycle and of the sensitivity of the
climate to changes in atmospheric concentration of CO2 would be more valuable
than information concerning the CCS technological option.
These conclusions would be even reinforced, if one considered the issues of
auto-consumption of energy and of leakages from the storages.
11A Optimal emissions, with an without CCS. Hedg-
ing scenario.
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Figure 1: Optimal emissions, with and without CCS
LY : CCS available from 2030, climate sensitivity learned to be L in 2040.
LN : CCS not available, climate sensitivity learned to be L in 2040.
CY : CCS available from 2030, climate sensitivity learned to be C in 2040.
CN : CCS not available, climate sensitivity learned to be C in 2040.
HY : CCS available from 2030, climate sensitivity learned to be H in 2040.
HN : CCS not available, climate sensitivity learned to be H in 2040.
The availability of CCS from 2030 does not signiﬁcantly modiﬁy optimal emissions before that
date. When climate uncertainty is resolved in 2040, the role of CCS is of greater importance when
the climate sensitivity is revealed to be dangerous. Note that in the case with central sensitivity,
availabilityofCCSoptimallyallowstoreduceemissionsmorethaninthecasewithhighsensitivity
but no CCS available.
12B Summary of the model
The DISCERNI model solves the following problem.
max
v0;:::;vd 1
E
(
d 1 X
t=0
Ut(ct) + E
"
max
(vd();:::;vT())
T X
t=d
Ut(ct()
  
#)
Decision: vt = (t;
ccs
t ;bt) where bt is the rate of investment
Laws of Motion
Capital Accumulation Kt+1 = (1   )Kt + 10btYt(t;
ccs
t ;Xt;Kt)
Endogenous Carbon Intensity t+1 = (1   e)
0
t+1 + et
0
t+1
0
t
(1   t)
Atmospheric Concentration Mt+1 = MMt + h(Xt) + Et(Kt;t;t;
ccs
t ) + LUt
Other Environmental Variables Xt+1 = g(Xt;Mt;)
Intermediate Variables
Available Output
Yt(Kt;Xt;t;
ccs
t ) = Ft(Kt)(1   Dt(Xt))(1   Ct(t)   C
ccs
t (
ccs
t ))
Emissions Et(Kt;t;t;
ccs
t ) = (1   t   
ccs
t )tF(Kt)
Climate damages for t < d Dt(Xt) = 0; for t  d Dt(Xt) = D(Xt)
Total Consumption ct = (1   bt)Yt(Kt;Xt();t;
ccs
t )
The time horizon is T = 40. Time step t = 0 corresponds to the period
2000–2009. The date of arrival of information, d, to the period 2030–2040.
Initial conditions are K0;0;M0;X0. Cost function Ct is strictly increasing
and convex. Utility Ut = 1
(1+)t log( ct
POPt). Damage function D is increasing and
convex.
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